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Abstract  
The illegal antiquities‘ traffic is a form of transnational organized crime and its roots often 
lead to drugs‘ and arms‘ trafficking and terrorism. Serious gaps of the existing legislative 
instruments,  such as  non-retroactivity, incomplete definitions,  non-punitive character and 
burden of proof, as well as strongly-felt trade interests are the reasons for the persistence of 
the problem. The necessity to resolve it, putting an end to the dispersion and destruction of 
the world cultural heritage and to the criminal activity which stands behind it, has been the 
key motivation of this research.  
 
The aim of this paper was to analyze the weaknesses of the existing international, European 
and national legislation and, on the basis of those, to construe a comprehensive EU legal 
response. The results were twofold. First, the grounds on which the EU should apply the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime to the illegal antiquities‘ traffic were 
made evident. Secondly, the key elements to be incorporated by a new EU legally-binding 
instrument  were  demonstrated  and  justified.  The  importance  of  the  EU  solution  was 
underlined as exemplifying for the international dimension.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   4 
Introduction 
The fight  against the illegal  antiquities‘ traffic has  so  far had little success
1:  the 
existing international, European and national legislation have been unable to stop dealing in 
illicit archaeological artifacts looted from source countries all over the world. However, the 
damage caused to the common cultural heritage of humankind is irreparable: it destroys the 
archaeological context of the sites, and often the objects themselves, which end up in private 
hands  never to  be seen by  wide public, nor studied by archaeologists.  Furthermore, the 
illegal antiquities‘ traffic presents a form of transnational organized crime and is closely 
connected to drugs‘ and arms‘ trafficking and terrorism.  
The present  paper has  aimed, firstly, at  revealing the weaknesses of the existing 
international, European and national legislative instruments and, secondly, at proposing a 
potential  EU-level  legal  solution.  The  analysis  of  the  legislation  demonstrated  several 
common features, such as non-retroactivity problem, insufficient coverage of definitions, 
lack of criminal law elements. However, the biggest obstacle represents the burden of proof 
problem which emerged as a true cornerstone of legislative effectiveness on all the levels. 
Moreover, the case-study of the UK demonstrated that a strong pressure is exercised by trade 
stake-holders on the market regulation policy-making, lowering substantially the reach of 
legislation.  
The EU is at the heart of the solution. Its pivotal location in the world, rich economic 
resources and wealth of collectors stimulate the insatiability of demand. The need to break 
the vicious circle of the illegal antiquities‘ trade is the basis of the proposed EU solution. 
First,  it  should  consist  of  the  application  of  the  UN  Convention  against  Transnational 
                                                 
1   Chauncey D. Steele, ‗The Morgantina Treasure: Italy‘s Quest for Repatriation of Looted Artifacts‘, Suffolk 
Transnational  Law  Review,  Summer  2000,  para.  668;  Stefano  Manacorda  &  Duncan  Chappell, 
‗Introduction.  From  Cairo  to  Vienna  and  Beyond:  Contemporary  Perspectives  on  the  Dialogue  About 
Protecting Cultural Artefacts from Plunder‘, in Stefano Manacorda & Duncan Chappell (eds.), Crime in the 
Art and Antiquities‟ World. Illegal Trafficking in Cultural Property, New York – Dordrecht – Heidelberg – 
London, Springer, 2011.      5 
Organized Crime to the illegal antiquities‘ traffic and, secondly, in the adoption of a new 
Directive  that  would  repair  the  existing  legislative  gaps.  The  grounds  for  applying  the 
UNTOC are presented and the recommendations for a new EU legislative instrument are 
outlined and justified. The EU-level solution is important for its potential to become a model 
internationally. 
 
1.  Illegal antiquities’ traffic: an overview 
The phenomenon of the illegal antiquities‘ traffic is global in nature and involves three types 
of countries: source, transit and market countries
2. The chain of supply- starts with common 
thieves and tomb robbers in source countries (Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Egypt, etc.) who often destroy the archaeological context and damage the objects themselves 
while  excavating
3.  For  relatively  small  amounts  of  money
4,  they  sell  the  objects  to 
professional dealers and middlemen who transport the goods towards final destinations
5. To 
smuggle  them,  dealers  make  use  of   a  variety  of  mechanisms:   counterfeiting  export 
certificates; bribing a competent certificate issuing authority; securing the transport of the 
stolen goods by “knowing someone who knows someone”
6 in the customs service; or by 
making use of big ―diplomatic bags‖
7. In all of these cases, the objects arrive on the market 
with  a  high  criminal  record  (violation  of  domestic  export  legislation,  theft,  fraud, 
                                                 
2   Kenneth Polk, ‗Whither Criminology in the Study of the Traffic in Illicit Antiquities?‘, in Simon Mackenzie 
& Penny Green (eds.), Criminology and Archaeology. Studies in Looted Antiquities, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2009, p. 14. 
3   Simon  Mackenzie  &  Penny  Green,  ‗Introduction:  A  Context  for  the  Engagement  of  Criminology  and 
Archaeology‘, in Simon Mackenzie & Penny Green (eds.), op. cit., p. 1. 
4   As compared to the final market prices for the artefacts, the tomb robbers receive not more than 1% of the 
total value, in  N. Brodie, J. Doole, P. Watson,  Stealing  History:  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  material, 
commissioned  by  ICOM  UK  and  Museums  Association,  Cambridge,  The  McDonald  Institute  for 
Archaeological Research, 2000, p. 13. 
5   Chauncey D. Steele, op. cit., para. 680. 
6   Simon Mackenzie & Penny Green, Criminalising the Market in Illicit Antiquities. An Evalua tion of the 
Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 in England and Wales, The Scottish Centre for Crime and 
Justice Research, 2009, p.  15, retrieved 5 March 2011,  http://www.sccjr.ac.uk/pubs/Criminalising-the-
Market-in-Illicit-Antiquities-an-Evaluation-of-the-Dealing-in-Cultural-Objects-Offences-Act-2003/32. 
7   Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole & Peter Watson, op. cit., p. 17.   6 
counterfeiting, corruption, etc.)
8. According to some estimates, 80-90% of antiquities on sale 
are of illicit origin
9. 
In market countries (France, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, the USA,  etc.), the 
demand is driven by dealers, auction houses, collectors, museums and galleries .  Interest in 
archaeological objects is dependent on its prestige and aesthetic value  as collectors strive to 
possess precious pieces
10.The overall financial value of the illegal antiquities‘ traffic is hard 
to be evaluated due to its invisible and seamless character
11. In fact, only 30-40% of antique 
dealings take place through auction houses where the pieces are published in catalogues
12; 
the rest occurs through private transactions
13. On the whole, the total financial value of the 
antiquities‘ market ranks third after drug and arms trafficking
14 and amounts to up to $6 
billion  yearly
15.  Finally,  the  links  between  the  antiquities   trade  and  drug   and  arms 
trafficking
16  and  the  financing  of  war  machines  and  terror  organizations  have  been 
reported
17, which puts antiquities trafficking on the level of a serious transnational organized 
crime.  Multi-billion antiquities revenues are used by Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah
18, to 
say nothing of more ‗common‘ drug smugglers dealing also in antiquities
19. In Afghanistan, 
there  are  entire  zones  controlled  by  Taliban  where  antiquities  are  excavated  and 
subsequently sold on the market at prices ranging from  €20-25.000 to 200-300.000.
20 The 
money goes to finance their war machine.  Mohammed Atta, who flew his  planes into the 
                                                 
8   Alesia Koush, ‗The illegal antiquities‘ traffic as a form of transnational organized crime‘, Bruges, College 
of Europe, April 2011, p. 6. 
9   Peter Watson, Sotheby‟s: The Inside Story, Random House, 1997, cited in Chauncey D. Steele, op. cit., 
footnote 6.  
10   Alesia Koush, op. cit., p. 3. 
11   Duncan Chappell & Kenneth Polk, ‗Unraveling the ―Cordata‖: Just How Organized Is the International 
Traffic  in  Cultural  Objects?‘,  in  Stefano  Manacorda  &  Duncan  Chappell  (eds.),  Crime  in  the  Art  and 
Antiquities‟ World. Illegal Trafficking in Cultural Property, op. cit., p. 104. 
12   Peter Watson, loc. cit. 
13   Alesia Koush, op. cit., p. 4. 
14   Lisa J. Borodkin, ‗The Economics of Antiquities looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative‘, Columbia Law 
Review, no. 2, 1995, p. 377-418.  
15   Ibid., p. 377. 
16   Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole & Peter Watson, op. cit., p. 16. 
17   Documentary ‗Spotlight: Blood antiques‘, LinkTV, http://www.linktv.org/programs/blood-antiques. 
18   Ibid. 
19   Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole & Peter Watson, loc. cit. 
20   Documentary ‗Spotlight: Blood antiques‘.   7 
Twin Towers in 2001, was trying to sell Afghan antiquities  in order ―to buy a plane‖ just 
several  months  before  the  tragedy.
21 The  externally  chic  antiquities‘  market  has  blood-
marked roots and effective action should be initiated to stop this criminal activity.  
 
2. Legislative basis: international, EU and national levels 
2.1 International legislation  
In 1970, the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
22 was signed and until 
now it remains the most comprehensive international instrument in the field.  The 1970 
Convention provides a framework for  legal action against the illicit traffic of cultural 
property. It provides definitions for the key categories, such as ‗cultural property‘
23, ‗cultural 
heritage‘
24,  and  ‗illicit‘
25,  and  it  contains    provisions  for  the  establishment  of  national 
services for the protection of cultural heritage, formation of laws, construction of lists of 
national cultural property, and supervision of archaeological excavations (Article 5). It also 
highlights guidelines for the introduction of export certificate systems (Article 6), import 
prohibitions (Article 7), penalties or administrative sanctions for infringements (Article 8) 
and promotes protection of cultural heritage by educational means (Article 10). 
However, it possesses serious gaps. First of all, it is not retroactive and applies only 
to the movements of cultural property after the date of its entry into force (1972).
26 Second, 
it only provides a reference point for  countries, leaving a very large margin of appreciation 
                                                 
21   Documentary  ‗Spotlight:  Blood  antiques‘,  with  the  reference  to  "Kunst  als  Terrorfinanzierung?",  Der 
Spiegel, 18 July 2005, retrieved 13 April 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41106138.html.  
22   The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer  of  Ownership  of   Cultural  Property  has  been  signed   by  more  than  120  states , 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
23   Art. 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
24   Art. 4b of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
25   Art. 3 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
26   Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting against Trafficking in Cultural Property, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,  Vienna, 24-26 November 2009,  http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ 
treaties/intergovernmental-meeting-on-trafficking-in-cultural-property.html.   8 
in terms of transposition into national legislation and implementation, which leads to a range 
of domestic laws and regulations that do not always live up to the levels of protection of the 
Convention.
27 Thus, Article 10a stipulates that ―as appropriate for each country‖, antiquities 
dealers, subject to penal and administrative sanctions, should maintain detailed registers of 
their items, but the wording itself, ―as appropriate for each country‖, weakens the effect of 
this obligation, and many state-parties do not impose this rule at all
28.  
Another important  gap concerns import prohibitions. Article 7.a obliges member-
states  ―to  prevent  museums  and  similar  institutions‖  from  acquiring  illegally  exported 
cultural property. However, it does not make export certificates
29obligatory, which renders 
the provision vague and symbolic.  Moreover, the  provision  tackles only  ―museums  and 
similar institutions‖, leaving aside private buyers that constitute a very big proportion of the 
antiquities‘ market.  
Furthermore, the Convention‘s scope is limited to the thefts from registered public 
collections  and  museums.  Private  collections    are  out  of  reach,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
unregistered cultural heritage. In fact, Article 3, which declares illicit any conduct contrary 
to the provisions of the Convention, combined with Article 1  in which cultural property is 
defined as the property ―specifically designated by each State as being of importance for 
archaeology, prehistory, art or science‖
30, have provoked a lot of controversy among experts. 
,They nevertheless have been generally interpreted as limiting the scope of Convention only 
to  the  registered  cultural  property,  reducing  the  effectiveness  and  applicability  of  the 
Convention  on  illicit  trafficking.
31  Finally,  the  Convent ion  operates  only  on  an 
                                                 
27   Simon Mackenzie, ‗Protection against trafficking in cultural property‘, background paper for the Meeting of 
the expert group on protection against trafficking in cultural property, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Vienna, 24-26 November 2009,  p. 8, www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/V0987314.pdf . 
28   Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting against Trafficking in Cultural Property. 
29   Simon Mackenzie, loc. cit. 
30   Art. 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
31   Simon Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 9.   9 
intergovernmental basis (Article 9), and private individuals have no possibility of making a 
request of return of their cultural property.  
Thus, the above analysis of the key points of the 1970 Convention demonstrates that 
it  is  more  ―a  diplomatic  rather  than  legal  instrument‖
32.,It  does  remain  an  important 
international  law  instrument  that  leaves    a  lot  of  room  for  bilateral  and  multilateral 
agreements (Article 9)
33.  
To provide remedies for the weaknesses of the 1970 Convention,  the UNIDROIT 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
34 was adopted in 1995. It was 
aimed at establishing a legal order for the restitution of stolen cultural objects
35 and for the 
return of illicitly exported cultural objects
36. Designed by a private law institution,  it put 
under its jurisdiction private persons and legal entities as well.
37  
On the level of definitions, the coverage was extended to unregistered artifacts since 
‗stolen‘  were  considered  the  objects  ―unlawfully  excavated  or  lawfully  excavated  but 
unlawfully retained, when consistent with the law of the State where the excavation took 
place‖
38. This in itself is a big step forward.  
Aiming at the restitution problem, the 1995 Convention had to resolve the issue of 
the legal title of ownership. In accordance with common law practice, it favored the true 
owner of an object over a good-faith purchaser (Chapter II), provided for the return of any 
stolen  cultural  property,  and  made  use  of  the  civil  law  system  allowing  a  good-faith 
purchaser  to  claim  compensation  from  an  original  owner  (Chapter  III)
39 .  However,  
compensation is due only  when a purchaser ―neither knew nor ought reasonably to have 
                                                 
32   Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole & Peter Watson,  op. cit., p. 36. 
33   Simon Mackenzie, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
34   The  1995  UNIDROIT  Conventi on  on  Stolen  or  Ille gally  Exported  Cultural  Objects  is   available  at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/main.htm; see Annex 1. 
35   Chapter II (Arts. 3-4) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
36   Chapter III (Arts. 5-7) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
37   Arts. 3-7 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
38   Art. 3(2) of the1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
39   Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole & Peter Watson, op. cit., p. 40; Chauncey D. Steele, op. cit., para. 692-693.   10 
known  that  the  object  was  stolen  and  can  prove  that  it  exercised  due  diligence  when 
acquiring the object‖
40. This provision reverses the burden of proof for compensation claims, 
although  the  concept  of  due  diligence  acquires  certain  specificity  in  the  context  of  the 
antiquities‘ market, 80-90% of which is illegal. The biggest archive of stolen art is the Art 
Loss  Register
41,  and a buyer is supposed to contact it before making a purchase. The 
Register will confirm that an object is not on their list and this procedure means that a buyer 
exercised due diligence
42. “But there is no digger who would ever put his object on record 
with the Art Loss Register!”
43, an ex-dealer says. Thus, inserted into the real-life context of 
the illegal antiquities‘ market the provision on due diligence becomes quite useless, and 
dealers can sell freshly dug up artifacts with no fear  of being punished.  
Furthermore, compensation and reverse of the burden of proof are to be applied only 
to the ―stolen cultural property‖ and not to the illegally exported cultural property (Chapter 
III). In the latter case, restitution is conditioned by the State proving that the removal of a 
particular cultural object ―significantly impairs‖
44 its interest, which is almost inapplicable to 
the unregistered archaeological heritage involved in trafficking.  
Thus, just as the 1970 Convention possesses elements of administrative law (export 
certificates, institution of national agencies, etc.), the 1995 Convention belongs rather to 
private and commercial law (with its focus on the restitution and on the compensation of the 
bona-fide purchaser), and in both only an accessory function is allocated to the criminal law
 
45. The lack of punitive mechanisms and practical enforcement renders them  helpless in the 
fight against the illegal trafficking in antiquities. 
                                                 
40   Art. 4(1) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
41   Art Loss Register, London, New York, Paris, Cologne, Amsterdam, https://www.artloss.com/content/home.  
42   Michel  van  Rijn,  former  antiquities‘  dealer,  in  Documentary  ‗Thieves  of  Baghdad‘, 
http://www.youtube.com watch?v=X4Q_0p1L_YU.  
43   Ibid. 
44   Art. 5(3) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
45   Stefano Manacorda, op. cit., p. 41.   11 
It is also necessary to be aware of the existence of a number of legislative texts 
adopted by the Council of Europe, such as  the 1985 European Convention on Offences 
relating  to  Cultural  Property
46 ,  the  European  Convention  on  the  Protection  of  the 
Archaeological  Heritage  of  1969
47,  subsequently  revised  in  1992
48 and  others.  T heir 
effectiveness, however, remains close to zero due to  a very limited number  of contracting 
parties and ratifications.  
2.2 The EU 
First of all, not all the EU states ratified the 1970 and 1995 Conventions
49. The EU 
legislation itself consists of two legal documents: the amended Council Directive 93/7/EEC 
on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State
 50 
and  the  Council  Regulation  (EC)  N.  116/2009  on  the  export  of  cultural  goods
51. These 
documents, created for the needs of internal  market and free movement of goods
52, do not 
contain the ‗fighting‘ arm of criminal law.  
The purpose of the Council Directive 93/7/EEC was ―to reconcile the fundamental 
principle  of  the  free  movement  of  goods  with  the  protection  of  national  treasures‖
53.  It 
provides for the obligation of member-states to return cultural objects unlawfully removed 
from the territory of another member-state (Article 2). However, it applies only to cultural 
                                                 
46   European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property, Delphi, 1985, http://conventions.coe.int/ 
treaty/en/treaties/html/119.htm; see Annex 1.   
47   European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage , 1969, http://conventions.coe.int/ 
treaty/en/treaties/html/066.htm.    
48   European  Convention  on  the  Protection  of  the  Archaeological  Heritage  (revised),  1992, 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/143.htm; see Annex 1.   
49   See Annex I. 
50   Council Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a 
Member State, amended by the Directive 96/100/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
February 1997 and by the Directive 2001/38/EC of the Europea n Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 
2001, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0038:EN:HTML.   
51   Council Regulation (EC) N. 116/2009  of 18 December 2008  on the export of cultural goods  (codified 
version, repealing the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural 
goods), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R0116:EN:NOT.   
52   Interview with Dr. Angela Casasnovas y Sesé, European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, Internal 
Market and Enforcement, Brussels, 28 March 2011. 
53   ‗Single market for goods – return of cultural goods‘, European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, 
retrieved  23  April  2011,  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/regulated-sectors/ 
cultural-goods/index_en.htm#h2-2.    12 
objects  ―classified  as  national  treasures  possessing  artistic,  historic  or  archaeological 
value‖
54, which means that it is of no use for the problem of looted archaeological heritage 
not present in the inventories of museums. , The burden of proof remains a very hard task for 
source countries that virtually need to prove that an object in question had belonged to the 
State before its illegal excavation and was exported after 15 March 1993.  
The Council Regulation (EC) N. 116/2009 on the export of cultural goods is also 
aimed at reconciling internal market needs with the need ―to ensure that exports of cultural 
goods  are  subject  to  uniform  controls  at  the  Community's  external  borders‖
55 .  The 
Regulation lays out for the introduction of an export certificate that should be presented at 
the customs control (Articles 2 and 4). It does not exercise any influence on illegal traffic 
inside the EU, therefore it is of limited use for the protection of EU source countries such as 
Italy, Greece or Cyprus. Oftentimes archaeological artefacts, illegally exported from these 
source countries, acquire a new legal status in another EU market state (in this case, a transit 
point) and, are then  exported outside the EU
56. 
As far as monitoring the implementation of these instruments, the issue of the illegal 
traffic in cultural property is on the agenda of four Directorates -General of the European 
Commission: DG Education and Culture, DG Taxation and Customs Union,  DG Enterprise 
and Industry and DG Home.  The DG Taxation and Customs Union works on the prevention 
of export of cultural goods from the EU member-states, and its advisory Committee for the 
Exportation and Return of Cultural Goods manages problems related to the EU regulations 
on export and return of cultural goo ds
57. In the meantime, the DG Enterprise and Industry 
and its  subdivision,  Single Market for Goods  –  Return  of  Cultural  Goods,  follows  the 
dossiers of the two EU legal instruments, Directive 93/7/EEC and the Regulation (EC) N 
                                                 
54   Art. 1.1 of the amended Council Directive 93/7/EEC. 
55   Preamble (3) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 116/2009. 
56   Simon Mackenzie & Penny  Green, Criminalising the Market in Illicit Antiquities, op. cit., p. 4. 
57   Open Method of Coordination – “Prevention of Theft and Illicit traffic” Subgroup, Final report, European 
Commission,  DG  Education  and  Culture,  14  May  2010,  p.  6,  http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-
development/doc1575_en.htm.    13 
116/2009,  as  they  concentrate  on  securing  free  movement  of  cultural  goods  within  the 
internal market
58.  
A bit more on the preventive side is the DG Education and Culture; its Sub-Working 
Group  on  the  Prevention  of  Theft  and  Illicit  Trafficking  of  Cultural  Goods  carries 
assessment studies and reports on transposition and implementation of the international and 
EU legislation in member -states and on appropriate application of due diligence when 
dealing with cultural heritage
59. However, in spite of the doubtless importance of these 
studies, the powers of the Sub-Group are limited by the working basis on which it operates - 
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)  leads neither to new binding legal instruments, 
nor to the obligation to modify national laws
60.  
Finally, the DG Home Affairs and its Unit A2 Fight against Organized Crime  does 
not work specifically on the problem of the illicit antiquities‘ traffic
61. However, following 
the conclusions of the EU JHA Council of 27-28 November 2008
62, in which the need for 
strengthening  prevention  and  fight  against  the  illicit  trafficking  in  cultural  goods  was 
highlighted, the DG Home was assigned with a public procurement to launch a study on the 
illicit trafficking in cultural goods.
63 The results of this study will be analyzed together with 
the reports of DG Enterprise, DG Culture, DG Taxation, and    new  legislation    will be 
proposed.
64 It will be up to the EU to  take a step forward in the previously-never-won fight 
against the illegal antiquities‘ traffic.  
 
                                                 
58   ‗Single market for goods – return of cultural goods‘, European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, 
cit. 
59   Working  Group  on  Museum  Activities,  DG  Education  and  Culture,  European  Com mission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-development/doc1575_en.htm.  
60   ‗Open  Method  of  Coordination‘,  http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/ 
definitions/openmethodofcoordination.htm 
61   Interview with Grzegorz Gajewski, European Commission, DG Home, Unit A2 – Fight Against Organized 
Crime, Brussels, 28 March 2011. 
62   Document  CRIMORG  166  ENFOPOL  14224/2/08,  http://www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/ 
import/1127_JAI/Conclusions/JHA_Council_conclusions_illicit_traffcking_in_cultural_goods_EN.pdf.  
63   Call  for  tender  „Study  on  preventing  and  fighting  illicit  trafficking  in  cultural  goods,  European 
Commission, DG Home Affairs, http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/tenders/2010/tender_037714_en.htm.   
64   Interview with Dr. Angela Casasnovas y Sesé.   14 
2.3 National legislation in source and market countries. 
Source countries exercise strict regimes of protection of their cultural heritage which 
nationalize and prohibit the unauthorized export of all the cultural property: discovered and 
undiscovered, registered and unregistered,  and above ground and underground (state-vesting 
legislation)
65.  However, their efforts are often unilateral since not all the market countries 
signed and/or ratified the 1970 and 1995 Conventions and, in case of the 1970 Convention, 
the transposition into national law might not have occurred
66.  
For this research, two case-studies of EU market countries were selected, Belgium 
and the United Kingdom. There are a number of reasons for this choice. First of all, Belgium 
and the UK are very active destination points for the arts and antiquities‘ trade, both on the 
EU level and in the international dimension
67. Second, they are very ‗convenient‘ places in 
terms of weak risks of legal prosecution. In Belgium there no laws governing purchasing 
policies of antique dealers, and they are not obliged to prove the legal origin of the objects 
they sell
68. Existing legislation in the UK is designed in such a way so as to make it almost 
impossible to prove the illicit character of the dealings
69.  In spite of this substantial 
difference in their legislative basis , the case-studies represent a typical situation in a market 
country with the activity of antiquities‘ dealers almost immune from jurisdiction due to the 
burden  of  proof  problem.  Finally,  the  conclusions  of  the  selected  case-studies  can  be 
successfully applied to other market countries in the EU and in the world.   
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66   See Annex 1. 
67   Simon Mackenzie & Penny  Green, Criminalising the Market in Illicit Antiquities, p. 2, p. 21; Documentary 
‗Spotlight: Blood antiques‘. 
68   Documentary ‗Spotlight: Blood antiques‘. 
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2.4  Case study: Belgium  
The Belgian antiquities‘ market, with the Brussels Zavel/Sablon at its heart, is known 
as a real ―linchpin for stolen art‖
70, since an antique dealer ―is not obliged to prove that he 
has come by the piece through legal channels‖, and ―pieces that have only recently been dug 
up can be sold here without any problem.‖
71 
In fact, relatively more control is exercised in Belgium over museums, libraries and 
archives (museums‘ practices are governed by federal and regional laws, international codes 
of ethics of museums, ICOM Statute (transposed into national law), good museum practices 
and even the principles of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, even if it has not been ratified 
by the country)
72,
73 and rather strict sanctions can be applied in cases of a serious breach of 
the established rules
74. On the contrary, the situation is completely di fferent in respect to 
private collectors, auction houses and dealers. There is no national legislation governing the 
acquisition  of pieces by actors falling under these categories, they are not controlled by any 
national authority, there are no obligations to request documentation upon acquisition, no 
penal or administrative sanctions are   imposed, and no awareness has been ever registered 
about the due diligence provisions of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.
75  
According to inspector Axel Poel s, Head of the Belgian Federal Police Squad on 
Works of Art and Antiquities, it is almost impossible to persecute anyone in Belgium , even 
though the police is aware of the illegal origin of many objects
76. The primary reason for this 
is the burden of proof.  In fact, the chain of the antiquities‘ market presents a number of 
                                                 
70   Inspector Axel Poels, Head of the Belgian  Federal Police Squad for Works of  Art and Antiquities, in 
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71   Documentary ‗Spotlight: Blood antiques‘. 
72   Ibid.  
73   Implementation of Due Diligence report, op. cit.  
74   Ibid, pp. 32-46. 
75   Ibid. 
76   Documentary ‗Spotlight: Blood Antiques‘.   16 
criminal and civil law offences
77, but the police has to prove that each specific object is 
stolen and the documents, if any, are counterfeited, which is an almost impossible task. 
In 2009, Belgium ratified the 1970 Convention, which has not changed substantially 
the situation
78. The Convention is to be transposed into national law, which has not yet taken 
place. However, even when it occurs, it will remain difficult  to enforce since, first, it deals 
mostly with registered objects and, second, due to its non-retroactivity: the police will have 
to verify if this or that collector had really possessed this or that piece before 2009 (year of 
ratification).
79 Thus, the act of ratification  was seen rather as symbolic and not having any 
actual influence on the market
80. 
Thus, due to the absence of national legislation on the antiquities  market regulation 
and to the impossibility to enforce effectively civil and criminal law provisions,  the illegal 
antiquities traffic is given practically absolute freedom in Belgium. 
2.5  Case study: the UK 
The UK is an important market for illegal antiquities, both as a transit stage and as an 
‗end point‘ in the chain of supply.
81 The UK ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 2002, 
and in 2003, it passed the transposing Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act
82 that 
provided for penal and administrative sanctions in case of acquiring a tainted object.
83 
However,  according  to  some  criminological  studies,  the  Act  was  ―purely  cosmetic‖
84 in 
nature and ―ineffective in achieving substantial effect on the trade‖
85. To understand the 
reasons for this assessment, it is necessary to look more closely at key provisions of the Act 
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78   Documentary ‗Spotlight: Blood antiques‘. 
79   Arthur Brand, Dutch journalist and art connoisseur, in Documentary ‗Spotlight: Blood antiques‘. 
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81   Norman Palmer & Colin Renfrew, ‗Ministerial Advisory Panel on Illicit Trade‘, Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport, London, December 2000, cited in Simon Mackenzie & Penny Green, Criminalising the 
Market in Illicit Antiquities, op. cit., p. 2. 
82   Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act, 2003, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/27/contents.  
83   Art. 1 of the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act.     
84   Simon Mackenzie & Penny Green, Criminalising the Market in Illicit Antiquities, op. cit., p. 9. 
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and  the  way  they  are  formulated  as  well  as  to  pay  attention  to  the  stake-holders  that 
participated in its negotiation and stipulation. 
Article 1 of the Act states that ―a person is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly deals 
in a cultural object that is tainted, knowing or believing that the object is tainted‖. The 
―knowing and believing‖ condition nullifies the reach of the whole text: it is practically 
impossible to prove that a dealer either knew or believed at the moment of acquisition that 
the object was tainted
86. As a result, according to a London police officer, the number of 
convictions and arrests related to the antiquities‘ crime fell from 34% in 2003 to 5% in 
2005
87.  
  Furthermore, the definition of ―tainted‖ includes only the objects illegally excavated 
(Article 2), but does not cover illegally exported cultural objects, thereby excluding a very 
considerable proportion of artifacts. Indeed, during the negotiation of the Act, the prohibition 
on dealing with illegally exported objects was considered ―a daily need‖ by the police, but it 
was not followed by the panel.
88  
The 2003 Act is not retroactive in character and this aggravates even further the 
problem of the burden of proof.  British law is generally  not retroactive, but the non -
retroactivity of the 2003 Act is rendered even more conviction -unfriendly: the prosecution 
has to prove not only that the dealing in a tainted object occurred after 30 December 2003, 
but the theft itself as well
89.  
Moreover, it is important to underline that during the stipulation of the Act, the major 
trade stake-holders played a decisive role
90. Even though the objective was to achieve  the 
most appropriate consensus for all, the question of ―what the dealers would acquiesce to 
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became  the  measure  of  how  tight  the  legislation  would  become‖
91.  As  a  result,  the 
instrument  is  hardly  enforceable  and  therefore  ―toothless‖
92.  Its  lack  of  actual  power  is 
obvious to the market, and little has changed in the majority of art dealers‘ practices.
93 This 
example can lead to a logical conclusion that in other market countries where the antiquities 
trade involves very high revenues, trade stake-holders must be rather influential in policy-
making and in the market-regulation attempts, if any occur at all.  
Thus, the two case-studies demonstrate several common features such as the non-
retroactivity of legislative instruments and low levels of enforceability. The most important 
common  denominator  remains  the  burden  of  proof  problem.  As    has  already  been 
demonstrated before, the burden of proof presents a serious obstacle for the EU law as well: 
it remains up to the prosecution to prove the fact that an object belongs to the state that is 
making  a  request.  However,  the  centre  of  attention  of  this  research  has  been  on  the 
antiquities market where the overwhelming majority of objects come from illicit excavations 
and that are not registered in public collections or museums, which renders the burden of 
proof a difficult task. In this context, it is important to demonstrate a case-study where these 
problems  have  been  successfully  overcome  and,  paradoxically,  on  the  British  soil.  The 
reference is made to the UN Security Council Resolution 1483
94 and, especially, to the 2003 
Iraq (UN Sanctions) Order (SI 1519)
95 transposing the Resolution.  
The UN Resolution prohibits  the  trade and transfer of suspicious Iraqi cultural 
property.
96 In the context of military activities in Iraq and the overall knowledge of lootin g 
of the Baghdad Museum, it is presupposed that anyone dealing in antiquities should have a 
reasonable suspicion on the legitimacy of objects from the zone.  
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The 2003 Iraq (UN Sanctions) Order (SI 1519) goes even further, introducing for the 
first time in the history of the fight against the illicit antiquities traffic, the reverse of the 
traditional burden of proof: 
Any person who deals in any item of illegally removed Iraqi cultural property shall be guilty 
of an offence under this Order, unless he proves that he did not know and had no reason to 
suppose that the item in question was illegally removed Iraqi cultural property
97. 
Moreover, the ―illegally removed Iraqi cultural property‖ definition applies to all the 
property removed from Iraq since the 6
th of August 1990
98, i.e. it is retroactive. The effect on 
the trade was immediate: publications of Iraqi objects in auction houses fell dramatically , 
and many of the Iraqi antiquities‘ dealers moved to a more illicit activity-friendly Belgium.
99 
It demonstrates once again the central character of the burden of proof problem and that the 
effective regulation of the illicit antiquities market can only be achieved through a common 
effort both at the source and at the destination points.  
 
3.  Role  of  the  EU  in  the  illicit  antiquities’  fight:  from  the  UNTOC  to  a  new  legal 
instrument 
The analysis of the EU legislation demonstrated its inconsistency: created for the needs of 
the  internal  market,  it  does  not  address  the  criminal  nature  of    illicit  traffic  and  its 
connections to drug and arms trafficking and terrorism. The national level approach is also 
unsatisfactory in market countries that either exercise a laissez-faire approach
100, or make 
only superficial steps towards regulation. International legal instruments, even if containing 
weaknesses, have not been signed or ratified by all the EU member-states. 
The necessity of  an adequate EU response is evident. This  section highlights that, 
first of all, the EU should follow the conclusions of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and 
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apply the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime to the illicit antiquities‘ 
traffic
101. Second, an EU-level legislative instrument is deemed absolutely necessary and its 
key points will be outlined and justified.  The role of Europol will also be underlined.   
3.1 Application of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime to the 
illegal antiquities’ traffic 
The  international  traffic  in  illicit  antiquities  is  a  form  of  transnational  organized 
crime
102. Therefore, the UNTOC should be applied to it, as   was recommended by the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime in 2009
103.  The grounds for this will now be examined. 
The illegal antiquities traffic involves more than three persons organized to dig up, 
smuggle and sell the objects with the aim of obtaining financial contribution, while the 
billion-value revenues are used to finance other criminal activities.
104 All this perfectly fits 
into the definitions of the UNTOC, according to which ‗transnational organized crime‘ is a 
crime committed in more than one state, with a substantial part of preparation taking place in 
another state, involving an organized criminal group and having substantial effects in more 
than one state.
105 And an ‗organized criminal group‘ is a group of three or more persons 
acting in concert with the aim of committing serious crimes
106 in order to obtain financial 
benefit.
107 
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Thus, there are several offences on the basis of which the Convention can be applied 
to the illicit antiquities‘ traffic.
108 Article 5 provides for the criminalization of participation 
in an organized criminal group and, consequently, the activity of the illicit antiquities‘ traffic 
participants should be criminalized
109. Article 6 lays out  the criminalization of laundering of 
proceeds of crime and, in our case, the antiquities on the market shall be considered as 
proceeds of crime. Moreover, acquiring something on the antiquities  market one has to be 
minimally aware of the risks of illegal provenance of the objects, and buyers should exercise 
minimal due diligence. Otherwise, ―the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, 
at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime‖
110 is considered an offence 
under  the  Convention  and  this  provision  can  be  applied  to  both  dealers  and  private 
collectors.  
The Convention provides also for the confiscation and seizure of the proceeds of 
crime (Article 12) and for the international cooperation for purposes of confiscation (Article 
13), and Article 8 criminalizes corruption in the public sector. These provisions could also 
be used against the illegal antiquities‘ trafficking.  
However, even though the Convention contains a clause on a possible shifting of the 
burden of proof – Article 12.7 states that ―States Parties may consider the possibility of 
requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of alleged proceeds of crime‖, the 
difficulty of proof remains a serious obstacle. 
The UNTOC was ratified by almost all the EU member-states (with the exception of 
the Czech Republic) and approved by the European Union as a whole (2004)
111. I consider it 
the first and minimal step on the way to regulating the antiquities market in the EU. Thus,  
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―states should criminalize activities related to trafficking in cultural property... and consider 
making the trafficking in cultural property a serious crime in accordance with their national 
legislation  and  article  2  of  the  Organized  Crime  Convention,  especially  when  organized 
criminal groups are involved.‖
112 
3.2  Recommendations for a new EU-level legally-binding document 
From a legal perspective, the EU has the basis for harmonisation in the field of illegal 
antiquities‘  traffic:  Article  83  (1)  of  the  Consolidated  Version  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union provides that directives may be adopted in  areas of 
particularly serious crimes with a cross-border dimension.
113 It is supported by Article 81 
(1), which stipulates that the Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having 
cross-border implications  by  means  of approximation  of  laws  and  regulations  in  civil 
matters.
114 
Now, on the basis of the previous analyses, the most essential aspects to be taken into 
consideration for a new EU legally-binding instrument will be highlighted and justified.  
a)  The definition of the illegally obtained cultural property should include both stolen and 
illegally  exported  cultural  property.  Important  legal  precedent  of  such  an  inclusive 
treatment is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora
115 which requires countries ―to sight export documentation before allowing 
import‖
116. This will be an opportunity to tie the legal import of the antiquities into the 
EU with legal exports from overseas
117. 
b)  The reverse  burden of proof should be adopted. The example of the Iraq (UN Sanctions) 
Order (SI 1519) should be taken as an example: any person who deals in any item of 
illegally removed cultural property of any country in the world shall be guilty of an 
offence, unless he proves that he did not know and had no reason to suppose that the 
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item in question was illegally removed cultural property
118. The reverse  burden of proof 
would simply imply purchasing legitimate cultural goods from reliable sellers.  If this 
leads  to  a  decrease  in    the  number  of  dealers  ,  this  should  not  deter  the  EU  from 
legislating but rather be considered   evidence of the illegal nature of the majority of 
antiquities on the market.  
c)  The respective provisions of the UNTOC should be incorporated into the new law. The 
legal precedent of this kind is the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in  Persons,  Especially  Women  and  Children
119 which was incorporated into the EU 
legislation by means of the 2002 Framework Decision on Combating trafficking in 
human beings
120, Council Directive 2004/81
121 and the EU Directive 2011/36/EU on 
fighting trafficking in human beings
122.  
d)  In terms of restitution of stolen and return of illegally removed cultural property, the 
relevant provisions of the UNIDROIT Convention (―the possessor of a cultural object 
which  has  been  stolen  shall  return  it‖
123 and  the  title  of  a  bona-fide  purchaser  to 
compensation
124 )  and  of  the EU Directive 93/7/EEC  (cultural  objects  ―unlawfully 
removed from the territory of a Member State shall be returned‖) should be made use of. 
The import of illegally exported goods to the EU should thus be controlled.  
e)  The retroactivity problem should also be addressed.  The Iraq (UN Sanctions) Order can 
be taken as an example as it is retroactive and is to be applied to all the cultural property 
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removed from Iraq after the 6th of August 1990. Thus, a precise date of entry into force 
of the new EU legislation should be determined.. This will have a preventive effect and 
reduce the purchases of illegal material. 
f)  The role of Europol should be enhanced. Up to 2007, Europol had a Cultural Property 
Crime Expert in its Property Crime Group under  Serious Crime Department SC4
125 that 
was carrying out projects on the fight against cultural crimes, such as development of an 
EU-wide model for a database on stolen cultural property and  the  preparation of  a 
manual on cultural property crime in the EU
126. Both of them were terminated when this 
role ceased to exist in 2007
127. If a new legislative instrument is adopted,  it will be 
essential to have a strategic EU law-enforcement unit that would coordinate, monitor and 
assist the implementation of a new law
128. Having in Europol the mandate to deal with 
―illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiquities and works of art‖
129, it should 
become the European point of reference in relation to this type of crime and carry out 
such tasks as the creation of databases, practical assistance in police cooperation between 
member-states, raising social awareness-, and sending the message that collecting illicit 
material is a crime. 
130  
Thus, a comprehensive  new EU instrument  would  overcome the weaknesses of 
previous legislation. However, there should be ―a clear set of prioritizing‖ coming from the 
Council of the European Union and from the European Parliament
131, and it is important not 
to let   trade interests override the necessity of co mbating the criminal phenomenon, as it 
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happened with the 2003 UK Act. In other words, the presence of political will is of crucial 
importance for the aim of regulation to be achieved. 
 
Conclusion 
The present research has aimed at investigating the legislative basis of the fight against illicit 
trade in cultural property. An  analysis has been carried out of the international, European 
and national legislation, proving the existence of significant gaps: incomplete definitions, 
vagueness of crucially important provisions, burden of proof problem, non-retroactivity, and 
the lack of a punitive element. The research also demonstrated that the above problems can 
lead to practical unenforceability of the law and the almost complete immunity of illicit 
dealings from jurisdiction.  
The  research  concentrated  particular  attention  on  the  EU  dimension,  where  the 
problem of the illegal traffic in cultural goods is addressed mainly from the internal market 
perspective and its criminal nature is given little attention. An adequate EU response should 
consist in the implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
to the illegal antiquities traffic and, ultimately, in the adoption of a new legally-binding 
instrument. Concrete recommendations were proposed.   
An effective EU-level response to the illegal antiquities traffic will have a spillover 
effect. both on the lower level of changing the practices in the member-states, and on the 
upper level in providing an example  for the international community. To put it with the 
words of the ex-head of the Property Crime Group of Europol Werner Gowitzke, ―cultural 
values are important on the long-term basis, and we should protect our heritage‖
132.  
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